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IH THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE POPP,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

8956

ARIE PETER ROTH and
GERARDA ROTH, his wife,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In accordance with appellant's brief, the appellant, George Popp, will be referred to herein as plaintiff, and the respondents, Arie Peter Roth and Gerarda Roth, will be referred to as defendants.
In plaintiff's habeas corpus proceedings the
Court determined that the custody· of ·the female
minor child by the defendants was legal and should
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

remain with the defendants and that the plaintiff
had no right to custody. In so ordering, the Court
found: (R. 190)
( 1 ) That the defendants have legal custody
pursuant to an order of Court made and entered in
connection with a proceeding for the adoption of an
illegitimate minor child.
(2)

That the child is illegitimate.

( 3) That the plaintiff is not the natural father
of the child.
(4) That the plaintiff is not a fit and proper
person to have custody of the child.
( 5) That the best interests and welfare of the
minor child require that she remain in the custody
of the defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendants agree essentially \Yith the facts
stated in appellant's brief as far as they go, but a
more complete statement of facts is required for an
understanding of the action of the Court below.
It is undisputed that the child involved herein
was illegitimate at the time of its birth. Further~ the
plaintiff does not dispute that defendants have complied with the provisions of Chapter 30, Title 78,
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U.C.A., 1953 pertaining to the adoption of an illegitimate child.
Plaintiff is thirty-four years of age CR. 64). The
natural mother of the child, Winifred Fleischmann,
is twenty-one years of age CR. 64). Both came to the
United States from West Germany but at separate
times. The plaintiff came in July, 1955 CR. 44).
Winifred came February 1, 1955 with her mother
and sister CR. 100). Plaintiff has known Winifred
ever since she was a young child of ten years CR. 40)
and claims to have had illicit relations with her in
Germany when she was seventeen years of age CR. 43,
64) and that the child involved herein is the issue of
such relations CR. 46).
During this time, plaintiff was married to another woman and had two living children by her
CR. 64-65).
At the time the child was conceived in October
1954, Winifred was not married CR. 84, 94). She
denies having sexual relations with plaintiff at this
time CR. 99). She states that the natural father of
the child is· an American soldier in whose home she
was living and working at the time CR. 95).
Plaintiff has denied that the child is his CR. 101,
112). The child was born to Winifred at Peoria,
Illinois, on June 15, 1955. She was not married to
plaintiff or any man at that time CR. 84, 95). The

3
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name given the child by Winifred was her maiden
name, Fleischmann ( R. 17) .
Plaintiff has never entered into a valid marriage
with Winifred because his divorce from his first wife
was not effective at the time he attempted to enter
into such a marriage in Peoria, Illinois on July 23,
1955 (R. 22).
Plaintiff's German divorce decree is dated June
28, 1955 (Exhibits D-3, D-4). This was after the
child was conceived ( R. 84, 94, 66, 6 7) and after the
birth of the child ( R. 66-6 7) . The German divorce decree by its terms . did not become effective until
November 21, 1955 (Exhibits D-4, D-8, R. 104, 106,
10 7, 163, 164) . Plaintiff left his two children in
Germany fatherless (R. 66-67) and traveled to Peoria,
Illinois where he attempted to marry 'Yinifred on
July 23, 1955. The date of this pretended marriage
is not disputed. It was before the effective date of
November 21, 1955 of the German decree, and plaintiff's first wife was and still is alive ( R. 186) .
;,;, :
Subsequent to this pretended marriage to 'Yinifred, and at the insistence and for the benefit of the
American sponsors of these aliens ( R. 112-113), there
was an attempt to change the name of the child by
an Illinois statutory• proceeding. The statute in this
.proceeding requires that there be a valid intermarrying of the· applicants as a ·basis for it. (Statute cited
4
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in Argument). It is upon this attempted marriage
and statutory proceeding that the plaintiff bases his
claim to being the legitimate father of this child.
However, it is apparent from the evidence that plaintiff's real purpose in asserting any claim to the child
is to use her as a pawn in an effort to reach the
mother, Winifred, who had left him, and to try to get
her to come back CR. 69, 67, 85, 86, 107, 110).

The evidence indicates that the attempted marriage of plaintiff and Winifred was a thing of convenience for them and their American sponsors CR.
96, 99, 100). Their life together was turbulent. The
evidence shows that from the time the child was a
few weeks old, the plaintiff frequently beat her
black and blue on the face and body and was cruel
and abusive to her and that on occasions the neighbors had to intervene CR. 73, 74, 85, 88, 91, 101, 102,
119, 120), and once he held her under water CR.
123). The plaintiff has neglected the child CR. 103,
112, 118, 121). He shows great partiality to a
younger child he knows to be his own CR. 89, 90., 91,
119). He did not attempt to support the child CR. 84,
85). Winifred's sister testified that plaintiff has
beaten and neglected the child ever since she was a
few months old ·CR. 169:...171 ) .
Winifred left the plaintiff in Peoria in September, 1957, and took the child involved herein to Salt
Lake City on September 3, 1957 (R. ·108). She left
5
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a younger child, Eliza beth, in the care of some friends
in Peoria CR. 67).
On September 29, 1957, Winifred placed the
child with defendants in Salt Lake City CR. 108).
This was after Winifred had notified plaintiff that
she was placing the child for adoption CR. 81 ) . On
October 23, 1957, after consulting with her own independent legal counsel CR. 19, 81), Winifred executed
an affidavit affirming that she had voluntarily delivered the child to the defendants on September 29,
195 7, for the purpose of adoption, relinquished her
rights to the child and consented that she could be
adopted by the defendants. Further, on the hearing
of the defendant's Petition for Adoption on October
23, 1957, Winifred appeared in Court with her own
independent legal counsel, testified that the plaintiff
·was not the natural father of the child, relinquished
her rights in the child to the defendants, and executed
the necessary consent to adoption CR. 16-18). At that
time the defendants also testified and executed the
necessary consents CR. 20-21 ) .
Pursuant to the adoption proceedings, the defendants have had custody of the child in their home
continually for nearly eighteen months since. September 29, 1957 CR. 128). The child \Yas sick, nervous and maladjusted upon coming into the home of
the defendants CR. RS~ 120). Because of the defendant's treatment of the child she \Yas afraid of him
and other men CR. 80, 85, 108, 129).
6
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The undisputed evidence is that the child is
now in good health, happy, and well-adjusted CR.
108, 110). The defendants are greatly attached and
devoted to the child and love her as their own. They
are people of good repute, and they have adequate
income and facilities to maintain and care for the
child CR. 128-133).
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
I.

The minor child involved herein is illegitimate.

II.

There has never been a legitimation of the child because
there never was a valid marriage.

Ill.

Defendants have complied with the statutory requirements
for the adoption of an illegitimafe child.

VI.

Plaintiff is not the natural father of the child.

V.

Plaintiff is not a fit and proper person to have custody of
the child.

VI.

The best interest and welfare of the child require that the
defendants retain custody of the child.

ARGUMENT

Point I.
The Minor Child Involved Herein Is Illegitimate.

It is undisputed that the natural mother was
unwed at the time the child was conceived and at the
7
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birth of the child. Further, it is undisputed that the
plaintiff was married to another woman at the time
the child was conceived and hom.
Point II.
There Has Never Been a Legitimation of the
Child Because There Was Never a Valid Marriage.

Any possible legitimation of the child required
a valid intermarrying of plaintiff and the natural
mother. The above facts and the argument below
show that plaintiff has never entered into valid marriage with the mother of the child.
If any legitimation of the child occurred, it
would had to have been in Illinois where the plaintiff
and natural mother and child resided and where the
plaintiff still resides. Plaintiff relies upon the following Illinois statute:
"An illegitimate child whose parents
intermarry who is acknowledged by the father
as the father's child shall be considered legitimate." (Ch. 3, Sec. 163, Ill. Ann. Statutes)
This statute presupposes that the intermarrying
persons be the natural parents of the child. The
evidence in this case is that the plaintiff is not even
the natural father of the child as \Yill be discussed
be~ow,, and, therefor~, this statute is not applicable.
The Illinois court has,tHf fact., ruled on its earlier
8
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statute containing almost identical language that the
establishment· of parenthood under such a legitimation statute is a prerequisite. This· question is discussed in the case of Miller vs. Pennington, 218 Ill.
220, 73 NE 919. The statute involved there was as
follows:
"An illegitimate child whose parents have
intermarried· and whose fath~r has acknowledged him or her as his child, shall be considered legitimate."
The Court said in that case that in order to show
legitimacy under that satute:
"It was necessary for them to establish
by the proof, three facts:

( 1) (That the persons seeking legitimamation) were the parents,
(2) That the said parents intermarried,
and
( 3) That 'the father'
them as his children."

acknowledged

A similar rule under a similar stat~te was.announced
in the California case, in re F~oods Estate, 21 P. 2d
579, 217 Calif. 763, and is set forth at page 59, 10
C.J.S., Bastards, Section 11 (b) as follows:
"In order to establish a claim of adoption
and legitimation, under the statutes described

9
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above, claimant has the burden to prove (all)
the essential elements of adoption and legitimation."
It is stated at page 68 of Section 12, 10 C.J.S.,
Bastards, that:
"In general, the party who sets up the
claim of legitimation by the intermarriage of
the alleged parents of an illegitimate child has
the burden to prove the existence of the essential elements of legitimation, as, for example,
the alleged father's paternity of such person,
the subsequent intermarriage of the parents,
and recognition or acknowledgement by the
alleged father."
Further, any attempted legitimation of the child
under the Illinois statute relied upon by the plaintiff
would be defective because there never was a valid
intermarrying between plaintiff and the natural
mother. The rule in this regard is stated in 7 Am.
Jur.-Bastards, Section 58, page 666:

"A statute providing that a child born before wedlock shall be made legitimate by the
subsequent marriage of its parents presupposes
a valid marriage, and it does not apply to a
child whose father had not, at the time of the
marriage, obtained a valid divorce from his
former wife."
In the case of Olmsted vs. Oln1sted, 190 N.Y. 458, 83
NE 569, affirmed in 216 U.S. 386, 5+ L. Ed. 530, 30 S.
10
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Ct. 292 pertaining to legitimation under a statute
similar to the one involved here, it was held:
"The statute relates only to such marriage
between parents as may be lawfully made,
and not to those which are polygamous, incestuous, or prohibited by law."
(A)

The Plaintiff Was Not Divorced From His
First Wife at the Time He Attempted to
Marry the Natural Mother.

The terms of the German divorce obtained by
plaintiff's first wife while plaintiff was still in
Germany, provided that it was not to become effective
until November 21, 1955. Therefore, plaintiff was
under a legal disability to enter into a valid marriage
with the natural mother on July 23, 1955.
The German divorce was heard June 21, 1955.
The decree is dated June 28, 1955, and contains the
following provision which was stipulated as being
a correct translation from the certified copy:
"II. It is hereby certified that the above
Decree becomes legally effective as of November 21, 1955."
It was stipulated that the German Statutes
referred to in the German Consul's letter of February
24, 1958 (Exhibit D-8) could be accepted as evidence
of what the pertinent German law was at the time
of the German decree and that the English transla11
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tion set out in the same letter is correct. The English
translation of these pertinent statutes as contained
in this letter is as follows:
"#5 Nobody may enter into a marriage
before his previous marriage has been nullified or dissolved."

"# 20 A marriage is void if one of the
spouses was legally married to a third person
at the time of the marriage contract."
"#41 The marriage is divorced by Court
decree. The marriage is dissolved when the
decree becomes effective."
Construing the language of the decree in the
light of the German statutes, the trial Court held
that the German decree did not become effective or
dissolve the marriage until November 21, 1955, and
until that time, the plaintiff was not divorced and
was under a legal disability to enter into a valid
marriage with the natural mother at the time he
attempted to do so on July 23, 1955.
The result of these statutes is to postpone the
effectiveness of the divorce until the required time
has passed.
Reference is also made to the stipulated evidence
that plaintiff's' first wife is still living so that he had
not acquirep. the 1e.gal capacity to n1arry the natural
~nother because- of tlie de~th of his first wife.

12
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It is submitted that ·any presumption that might
exist as to the validity of the second marriage is
clearly and convincingly overcome as a matter of
law in view of the above facts, provisions of the
decree and statutes, and the authorities immediately
hereafter referred to.
(B)

The Disability to Marry Created by a
Divorce is Determined by the law of the
Jurisdiction of the Divorce and Follows the
Person.

It is the universal rule that where a statute, by
its express terms or by interpretation, provides that
it postpones the effectiveness of the divorce during
the interlocutory period, the plaintiff is under a
legal disability to enter into another valid marriage
during such period, and this disability attaches and
follows the person wherever he may go. The rule
in this regard is set forth in 32 A.L.R. page 1125 in
which a leading case, Heflinger us. Heflinger, 136,
Va. 289, 118 SE 316, 32 A.L.R. 1088 is referred to
and the rule is stated as follows:
."If the effect of the proVIsion of the
statute or the decree of divorce is to postpone
the dissolution of the former marriage until
the lapse of the prescribed period, it is clear
that a ;remarriage within that period will not
be. recognized or given effect in the state
where the decree was granted, or, .for that
matter, in any other state, since, ex hypothesi,
one of the ·parties at the time of remarriage

13
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had not the status of an unmarried person.
In Heflinger vs. Heflinger, the Court holds
that a provision of the statute to that effect
is part of the decree and within the full faith
and credit provision of the Federal Constitution."
The rule in regard to the force and effect of an
interlocutory judgment or decree of divorce is stated
in Section 474, Page 579 of Vol. 17 Am. Jur. Divorce
and Separation
"An interlocutory judgment or decree of
divorce does not sever the matrimonial bonds;
only a final decree or judgment is effectual
to dissolve the marriage and restore the
spouses to the status of single persons and to
render each competent to marry again. After
an interlocutory decree and until the entry of
a final decree, the marital relation continues
as before, with the rights incident thereto.
Marriage after the entry of a decree nisi and
before final decree is therefore null and void.
notwithstanding it is contracted in another
state."
The same rule is found in Goodrich on Conflicts
of Law, Hornbook Series. 2d Edition, Pages 30 7 and
308 which reads as follovvs:
"Under the divorce practice in some jurisdictions, an absolute decree is not first
entered, but merely an interlocutory order or
decree nisi. \Yhich is made absolute at some
later date, if in the meantime the Court has

,

1+
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~

1

not become convinced that a divorce should
not be granted. Until this decree is made final,
the parties are not divorced; a second marriage is bigamous, because the first one still
exists.''
All of the Utah cases that have considered the
force and effect of an interlocutory decree have held
that the marriage relationship continues to exist
until the expiration of the interim period. Johnson
vs. Johnson, 207 P. 2d 1036; Sanders vs. Industrial
Commission, 64 Utah 372, 230 P. 1026; Hendrich vs.
Anderson, 191 F. 2d 242; Anderson vs. Anderson, 121
Utah 237, 240 P. 2d 966.
The following statement is contained In the
Hendrich case:
"Where interlocutory divorce decree was
entered in wife's divorce action and decree
provided divorce should not become final and
absolute until expiration of six months from
date thereof, status of husband and wife
between parties continued until six months
period has elapsed."
The Illinois courts hold that a marriage entered into during an interlocutory period of a divorce
is absolutely void. Illinois does not now have a
waiting or an interlocutory period for divorce.
However, its rule in regard to this is clearly set forth
in the cas·e of Stevens vs. Stevens, 304 Ill. 297, 136
NE 785. Further, the Illinois law and attitude re-

15
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garding prohibited marriages is contained in an
express statute. Ch. 89, Sec. 19, Ill. Ann. Stat., which
provides that prohibited marriages are void even if
the parties attempt to circumvent the prohibition by
going out of the state.
The language of this Illinois statute is as follows:
"If any person residing and intending to
continue to reside in the state and who is disa bled or prohibited from contracting marriage
under the laws of this state shall go into
another state or country and there contract
a marriage prohibited and declared void by
the laws of this state, such marriage shall be
null and void for all purposes in this state
with the same effect as though such prohibited
marriage had been entered into in this state."
Plaintiff's brief contains some statements and
cases regarding the lack of extraterritorial effect of
prohibitions against marriage in divorce decrees. All
of these cases can be distinguished from the authorities cited by the defendants herein. In all cases
cited by the plaintiff, in support of this proposition,
they deal with statutes which provide or have been
interpreted to mean. that they do not postpone the
effectiveness of the divorce decree but merely prohibit a marriage within a stipulated time and makes
such actions subject to penalty. The cases cited by
plaintiff do not deal with divorce statutes which
expressly defer or have been interpreted to defer
the severance of the marriage relationship until the
expiration of the interim period.

16
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A fair reading and interpretation of the above
referred to German statutes and the provisions of
the German divorce decree clearly puts the decree
and the German statutes in this latter category
which suspend the operation of the divorce until the
time has elapsed. Both plaintiff and defendant refer
to and rely on cases cited in 32 A.L~R. beginning at
1116 and 51 A.L.R. 325. However, all these cases can
be distinguished. Where the statutes involved in
these cases expressly or by interpretation suspend
the operation of the divorce and continue the marriage until the expiration of the intervening period,
the status created thereby is given extraterritorial
effect. In those cases which involve statutes which
provide or have been interpreted to mean that the
marriage is severed at the time of divorce and that
the intervening period is a mere prohibition against
remarriage, the cases generally refuse to give such
prohibition extraterritorial effect. However, in many
of these latter type cases, some courts grant extraterritorial effect to such prohibition.

The Restatement of the Law of Conflicts, expressly distinguishes between the laws which provide
for an immediate final divorce but ·attach a period
prohibiting remarriage and the laws which extend
the marriage from the date of entry of the decree
until the lapse of a stipulated time. The rule in this
regard is· stated atpage 194 in Comment (a) under
Section 130 in the Restatement as follows:
17
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"Provisional decree distinguished. A distinction is to be noted between this case and
a case where a divorce is, by the law goveming
it, provisional only until the lapse of a certain
time, or the common case of a decree nisi, or
the so-called interlocutory decree, which does
not become absolute until further proceedings
or after the lapse of a certain time. In such a
case, neither party ceases to be married until
the lapse of the given time, and neither can
marry again in any state, since such marriage
would be bigamous."
The plaintiff emphasizes the Colorado case of
Bauer vs. Abrahams, 73 Colo. 509, 216 P. 259. In that
case, the Colorado Court was merely called upon to
review two conflicting Kansas statutes and determine
that the interlocutory period of a Kansas statute
was a mere prohibition against remarriage during
the period and was not entitled to extraterritorial
effect.
A close examination of the other cases reviewed
by the plaintiff will indicate that they can be similarly distinguished, and they do not change the
rule that whenever the statutory provisions provide
or are interpreted to mean that they~ postpone the
dissolution of the marriage ties until the specified
time has elapsed, the Courts are uniform in stating
that the lack of legal capacity to remarry because
of an existing marriage during such period is given
extraterritorial effect.
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(C)

The Validity of a Marriage or a Legitimation Depends Upon the Capacity of the
Actor and Not Alone Upon His Outward
Acts.

The plaintiff makes much of the argument that
a marriage or legitimation must be determined by
the law of the domiciliary state. Defendants are
willing to concede, for the sake of plaintiff's argument, that generally the validity of a marriage or
a legitimation is to be decided by the law of the
place where they occur. In this case, the laws of
Illinois would apply.
However, the Illinois law can only be used and
applied in keeping with the facts. and the status in
relation to persons as they are found to exist at the
time. Plaintiff will agree, that the mere performance
of acts in outward compliance with statutes will not
accomplish a marriage if the parties so acting are under a legal disability or have no legal capacity to so
act. Particularly is this true if in the jurisdiction
where an act is attempted, the question of legal
capacity has never been raised or determined.
At the time plaintiff attempted to marry in
Illinois, his legal status or capacity to marry was
not raised, and the mere fact that he went through
the procedures of marriage and legitimation based
upon such marriage, did not clothe him with the
capacity to do so and thereby make such acts valid.
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Certainly the laws of Illinois would not sanction or
treat as valid a marriage where one of the parties
was already married just because the parties went
through the required procedure.
It is amply demonstrated by the cases and law
referred to above, that the crux of our problem is to
determine the legal status or capacity to marry that
may or may not have been created by a divorce
decree of another jurisdiction. To do this, vve must
look to the divorce laws of that jurisdiction. This
was done by the trial court as set forth in Point I
(A) above.
(D)

The

United

States

Courts

Recognize

Decrees of Foreign Countries.

The divorce decree of a foreign country and the
status there by created should be recognized by the
courts of the United States. The rule in this regard
is set forth in Section 959, Page 141 of Yol. 17 (a)
Am. Jur.- Divorce and Separation:
"Judgments of courts of foreign countries
are recognized in the United States because
of the comity due from one nation to another,
its courts and judgments. Such recognition
is granted to foreign judgments with due
regard to international duty and convenience,
on the one hand and to rights of citizens of
the United States and others under the protection of its laws, on the other hand. This
rule is frequently applied in divorce cases; a

20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

decree of divorce, granted in one country by
a court having jurisdiction to do so, will be
given full force and effect in another country
by comity, not only as a decree determining
status, but also with respect to an award of
alimony and child support."
(E)

The Capacity of Persons to Marry is
Determined as of the Date of the
Ceremony.

At the time plaintiff attempted to marry the
natural mother, the plainttiff had no legal capacity
to do so. Further the expiration of the disabling
period did not thereafter make the marriage valid.
The right of persons to marry is determined as of
the date of the ceremony. The rule in this regard
is stated in Sec. 182 (a) Page 841 of Vol. 27 C.J.S.Divorce, as follows:
"Remarriage prior to the date on which
the prohibition of the statute or decree terminates is not subsequently validated by
removal of the legal barrier since the right
to marry is determined as of the date of the
ceremony."
Further, in the Utah case of Hendrich vs.
Anderson, 191 F. 2d 242, it is stated as follows:
"Where interlocutory divorce decree was
·entered in wife's divorce action, and decree
provided divorce should not become final and
ab~olute until expiration. of six months from
date thereof, ~nd defendant husband attempt-
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ed to marry another woman in sister state
before expiration of the six months period,
fact that defendant husband and such other
woman continued to live together as man and
wife after expiration of six months period did
not validate attempted marriage, since such
marriage was void ab initio."
"A relationship meretricious in its inception is presumed to continue so and burden
of proving a subsequent marriage rests on
party asserting it."
(F)

Child

Is

Not

Issue

of An

Attempted

Marriage.

Plaintiff claims that the child is legitimate by
reason of the provisions of Chapter 89, Sec. 17a
Ill. Ann. Stat. which provides:
"Whenever persons attempt or have attempted to contract and be joined in marriage,
and some form of marriage ceremony recognized by law has been performed in apparent
compliance with the law in relation to
marriage, and pursuant to such attempt to
contract and be joined in marriage, cohabit
or have cohabited together as husband and
wife, and there is issue born after the taking
effect of this Act, as a result of such cohabitation, such issue is hereby made legitimate
and may take the name of the father~ though
such attempted marriage is declared void or
might be declared void, for any reason."
Here again, the uncontroverted facts of this case
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do not bring it within the purview of this statute.
The application of the statute is fatally defective
because to come within the provis~ons of it, the
parents must have cohabited in pursuance of a void
or voidable marriage and the child must have been
born issue as a result of such cohabitation. Since
the child herein was born before there was any
attempted marriage, she could not have been the
issue of any cohabitation pursuant to an attempted
marriage as is required by the statutes.

POINT III.
Defendants Have Complied with the Statutory
Requirements for the Adoption of an Illegitimate Child.

Under Chapter 30 of Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, no notice is required to be given to
the natural father in the case of an adoption of an
illegitimate child.
The record shows that the defendants have
fully complied with the provisions of Chapter 30
pertaining to the adoption of an illegitimate child
and the plaintiff has not attempted to show otherwise in the proceedings below or in connection with
the appeal herein.

POINT IV.
Plaintiff. is Not the Natural Father of the· Chitd.
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It is submitted that where as here, there is a
child conceived and born out of wedlock of questionable patemity, the restrictive rule of evidence that
the mother may not testify directly as to non-access
does not apply. Counsel has spent many hours trying
to find an authority or a case that discusses whether
this rule should be applied in such a proceeding to
determine the patemity of an admittedly illegitimate child, and he has been unable to find such
a case.
Since in a situation such as we have here, the
child is admittedly illegitimate, the reason given
for the rule disappears. In fact, \Vigmore attacks
the basis and value of the restrictive rule in any
situation. In Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed. Vol. VII.
Sec. 2063, he traces the devious development of this
present rule and characterizes it as "Lord Mansfield's
dogmatic pronouncement." He states that the rule
~'may have become, in some jurisdictions, too deeply
planted to be uprooted" but sets forth:
"It is agreed, however~ on all hands, that
the prohibited testimony concerns solely the
specific fact of non-access, i.e., testimony to
any other fact constituting illegitimacy or to
illegitimacy in general is admissible."
In this same authority (Wigmore) at Sec. 133,
Vol. I, it is stated:
"On this principle it is permissible to
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show, in a filiation or bastardy prosecution,
that the mother had intercourse with another
man about the time designated as the period
of gestation, for this predicates an equal possibility of conception through someone else's
act."
Utah follows the rule "that in a bastardy proceeding, intercourse with others than the defendant
within the period of gestation may be shown."
State vs. Hammond, 46 Utah 249, 148 P. 420.
Defendants contend, therefore, that in determining the paternity of an admittedly illegitimate
child as is the case before the Court, the restrictive
rule that a mother cannot testify directly as to non. access does not apply, and the Court should be free
to consider any competent evidence that would have
a bearing on the paternity of the child. However,
if it is deemed that the restrictive rule should apply,
there is certainly sufficient other testimony and acts
of the natural mother and of the plaintiff to support
a finding that the plaintiff is not the natural father.

POINT V.
Plaintiff Is Not a Fit and Proper Person To Have
Custody of the Child.

The record 'of this case is replete with evidence
reflecting adversely upon the fitnes~ of the plaintiff
·to :have -custody of .this three .and one-half year-old
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female child. He cared so little for his first wife and
family that while he was still married, he carried
on an illicit relation with a seventeen-year-old girl.
He apparently has no affection for children as is
shown by his leaving his two small children in
Germany fatherless. It is submitted that any man
who would beat a child black and blue while of
the tender age of a few weeks for any reason is not
a fit person. The reasons given by the plaintiff for
such actions are that the child would cry or would
not go to sleep. The plaintiff admits that on one
occasion he struck the small girl to an extent sufficient to bruise her, and admits that at least on one
occasion the neighbors intervened in the course of
his beating the child. The natural mother and her
sister testified to many occasions upon which the
plaintiff beat the child black and blue, and on one
occasion, beat her in the face. On several occasions
the neighbors intervened when plaintiff \Yas abusing
the child.
The plaintiff frequently left the infant child
alone and unattended. He showed great partiality
toward a younger child \Yhich he kne\Y to be his
own. The plaintiff allowed the mother to take the
child involved herein \Yith her at the tin1e she left
him, and the younger child \Y hich he kne\Y to be
his, remained in Peoria, Illinois. It is apparent that
plaintiff has no real interest in this child, and it
was only when he became aware that the mother

26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

intended not to come back to him and intended
getting a divorce, that he has become interested in
the child as a pawn in the hope of reaching the
mother and persuading her to come back to him.
Under the undisputed facts of the record, it can
be safely concluded that the plaintiff is not a fit
and proper person to have the custody of this child.
POINT VI.
The Best Interests and Welfare of the Child Require
that the Defendants Retain Custody of Her.

The Utah courts have always held that the
overriding consideration in determining the custody
of a minor child is the welfare of the child. In an
early case, Kurtz vs. Christensen, 209 P. 340, 61 Utah
1, it was held:
"Even in a case where the parents of the
child intermarried after its birth, their right
to reclaim the child from persons to whom
the mother had given the child shortly after
its birth, was denied on the ground that the
best interests of the child would be served by
leaving it in the possession of such persons."
The rule in regard to child custody cases such
as the one here under consideration is well defined
in Walton vs. Coffman, 169 P. 2d 97 a~ follows:
27
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"We conclude that the determining consideration in cases of this kind is: What will
be for the best interests and welfare of the
child? That in determining this question there
is a presumption that it will be for the best
interest and welfare of the child to be reared
under the care, custody and control of its
natural parent; that this presumption is not
overcome unless from all of the evidence the
trier of the facts is satisfied that the welfare
of the child requires that it be awarded to
someone other than its natural parent."
In the above case, the custody of two children
was given to the maternal grandparents rather than
the mother. This rule has been followed in the
subsequent cases of Baldwin vs. Nielson, 17 4 P. 2d
437 and Briggs vs. Briggs, 181 P. 2d 223.
In the case now under consideration, the trial
court after seeing and hearing the ·witnesses, found
that the best interests of the child required that it
remain in the custody of the defendants, the adopting parents. In the Walton vs. Coffman case, the
Court, in making its decision, reiterated the "Tell
known rule that· in an equity case, the factual record
is also before the appellate court for revie'Y but that
"in so doing, we (the Court) should keep in
·mind that the trial judge saw and heard the
witnesses and observed their demeanor and
was acquainted with the circumstances sm·rounding the giving of their testimony, and,
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therefore, was in a better position than we are
to weigh and evaluate their evidence."
I

:

The mother has voluntarily and irrevocably
relinquished the custody of the illegitimate child to
the defendants. The trial court has found that plaintiff is not the natural father. The plaintiff has failed
in one marriage and has turned his back on the
children of that marriage. The plaintiff has failed
in a second attempted marriage. Plaintiff shows a
history of brutality, neglect and lack of interest in
the child and a desire to use the child to serve his
own ends with her mother. At best, his ability and
capacity to care for the small girl would be makeshift and uncertain. The life of this young child with
the plaintiff would have all the "built in" elements
that lead to unhappiness, heartache, maladjustment
and disaster for the child.
The defendants have had custody of this three
and one-half yea:r-old child for almost a year and
one-half by order of the Court in the adoption proceedings. She was sick, nervous and maladjusted and
afraid of men ·when she was. placed with the defendants. They have carefully and lovingly cared
for her so that she is now happy, contented and welladjusted. The defendants have the ability and
capacity to. provide· ideal c:a:re and :home for the
child. They· are devoted and deeply attached to her
and love her as their own.
1

}

-')-·
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff
has no legal claim to the child for the reasons set
forth above in Points I through IV. Further, the
best interests of the child require that the child
remain with the defendant adopting parents for the
reasons set forth above in Points V and VI.
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully
submitted that the Decision and Order of the Trial
Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
OWEN & V\FARD
Counsel for the Defendants
and Respondents,
141 East Second South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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